THE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT Let me summarise the position so far as we have gone. A statement or description is considered to be a false trade description in the following circumstances: ß First, if it is a false statement, whether direct or indirect, under the various headings which I have mentioned that is if it concerns quality or weight, etc. Secondly, if by altering a trade description a false trade description is created. Thirdly, if, although it is a trade mark, it is also a false trade descrip- tion. Fourthly, if it is likely to be mistaken for a trade description. Fifthly, if, although not on the face of it a trade description at all, it can be mistaken by a purchaser for a trade description. Unless a trade description falls under one of the headings I have men- tioned then it is not a trade description and does not constitute an offence under the Act. Thus a mere claim as to the value of the goods--"worth twice the money," or the use of vague superlatives, such as "everyone uses," "the best in the world," "the finest value in the market," are not trade descriptions, unless they are related to a particular standard for the goods in question. But, as I have said, the 1953 Act provides that anything likely to be mistaken for a trade description is deemed to be one, and so a form of words which is likely to be mistaken by a purchaser for a trade description may create an offence. I have mentioned that a trade description, if entirely verbal, does not fall under the Act but this does not mean that to be a false trade description it must be in written or printed words, for it may, and often does, take the form of a picture, or an indication by means of get-up. One example is the use of a tartan label on a bottle of whisky, which would indicate to the ordinary purchaser that it contained Scotch whisky. Similarly, a picture of sheep used in connection with a garment would indicate that the article was made of wool. To constitute an offence there is no need for the purchaser to be actually deceived or mislead a false description on goods which are merely displayed as being on offer for sale is as much an offence as actually selling them. And it is not a defence to say that no purchaser would be likely to be deceived. A beer bearing a Bass label sold in another brewer's bottle led to a conviction. I shall now try to explain more fully the meaning of a trade description, and incidentally of a false trade description, and the best way is to go in detail through the seven definitions of a trade description given by the Act. The first definition concerns a description as to the number, quantity, measure, gauge or weight of goods. This is, of course, a very common 215

JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF COSMETIC CHEMISTS form of trade description. In a case not connected with this Act, a distin- guished judge said, "A ton does not mean about a ton, nor a yard about a yard" and the same principle applies here. An i•stance of the vagueness of measurements commonly to be found is in the sizes for sheets and blankets the term "double or single bed size" may therefore cause misunderstanding you will find, however, that reputable firms give the actual measurements. An example of statutory provision is the Sale of Food Act, 1926, which provides that a statement as to the weight or measure of pre-packed foods is deemed to refer to the net weight, unless otherwise specified. And, of course, a large part of the law is covered by the extensive Weights and Measures legislation. If there is uncertainty about the weight or quantity of contents the manufacturer should declare it, as, of course, is generally done with a box of matches. You will find that other goods, particularly tobacco, bear words about evaporation as a safeguard against misdescription under this section. The second definition concerns the standard of quality of any goods according to a classification commonly used or recognised in the trade. This is a new offence, added by the 1953 Act. In the original Bill there was no reference to a standard based on a trade classification, and these qualifying words were only added after much discussion. It would be interesting to speculate upon the position which would now exist if it were an offence to falsely describe the standard of quality of goods as such, but this is not now relevant, and all I will say is that a standard of quality imposed without reference to any existing criterion would only lead to endless and unnecessary trouble. We have, therefore, much cause to be grateful that the clause was amended. It is important that we should know what exactly this addition to the Act implies. It is clear that if there is any direct or indirect indication on the goods themselves about their standard of quality according to some trade classification, then if the indication is false or misleading, an offence under the Act has arisen. The specifications of the British Standards Institution, when generally accepted by a particular trade, are an example of the trade classifications to which the Act refers. The Institution allows manufacturers of goods made according to their standards to bear the "kite mark" which is the registered trade mark of the Institute. To apply such a "kite mark" to goods which do not comply with the standard demanded by the Institute would be an offence under this sub-clause. The standard required by a trade can also be indicated by words. Thus, to describe a garment or material as "fadeless" indicates that it conforms to a particular standard adopted by the textile trade, and if the article does not so conform (even though it is in fact not subject to fading) then an offence will have been committed. What then is the effect of this provision on the synthetic materials and substances which are so common to-day ? A 216