JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF COSMETIC CHEMISTS that the words "linen," "woolien," "silk," "Egyptian cotton," to take but a few instances, mean exactly what they say. But is it false in a material respect to mark goods as woollen if they contain a small percentage of cotton? In practice it is a question of fact for the magistrate or jury to decide whether the percentage is great enough to make the description false or misleading, and, as an example, a conviction was obtained for describing gabardine raincoats as wool, when in fact they contained less than 60 per cent wool. The Retail Trading Standards Association concerns itself mainly with the textile trade, and has obtained convictions in cases where rayon goods were described as cotton, and where cotton articles were described as linen. It may be a matter of interest, if not of surprise, to know that this Association has decided that the expression "camel hair" means hair from a camel, and not from any other beast, or source. The British Standards Institution also lays down standards in the textile trade when they are accepted by the whole trade they are binding on all manufacturers. Pictorial representations can, of course, be false or misleading. A man was therefore convicted for attaching a label bearing a picture of two sheep to blankets not made of pure wool, but of a mixture of wool and rayon this picture, of course, gave the impression that the blankets were made of wool alone. The Act does not lay down standards for materials used in the manu- facture of goods, but even if, within the trade, a particular standard is applied, and the goods are undoubtedly up to that standard, that fact will not be conclusive evidence that the description is not false in a material respect. In the vinegar case to which I have referred, the expression "non- brewed vinegar" was recognised to some extent as a synonym for dilute acetic acid, and the Ministry of Food had in fact issued numerous licences to make the product under that name. None the less the Courts held that it was a false trade description as the preparation was not true vinegar. In many cases, however, a statutory as opposed to a mere customary standard has been laid down, and then, of course, the Courts will uphold that standard. For example, the Food and Drugs Act and its regulations set out certain rigid standards of material composition and to deviate from them is to court disaster. If no standard of any sort is available the magistrate will fix his own. In 1936 a manufacturer sold soap as "Medicated Lysol Soap" which in fact contained 0.1 per cent of lysol. The magistrate upheld a submission by the prosecution that to qualify for the description of lysol soap there must be not less than 1 per cent of lysol. On appeal the divisional court held that although there was no statutory or other standard to serve as a guide, the magistrate had power to fix the standard at 1 per cent, and the manufacturer was accordingly convicted of a false description. False descriptions about material composition are now dealt with, in the 220

THE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT pharmaceutical field, by the Pharmacy and Medicines Act, which requires medicines to disclose the correct formula. I would like to mention one other instance of the malerial composition of a preparation, which although not entirely relevant, may be of interest. Some of you are probably well aware of the ancient trade mark "Bristol Milk" applied to bottles of sherry. It may seem ludicrous to suggest that the word "milk," as used here, is a trade description relating to the material of which the goods are composed, but this in fact is what one Ministry did only a few years ago. After pressure had failed to induce the bottlers to abandon the mark, the Ministry threatened to prosecute and were only deterred by the publication of the facts in the Press and Parliament. The seventh (and last) definition is of rather limited interest and I shall deal with it only briefly. It concerns a description as to goods being the subject of an existing patent, privilege or copyright. The basis of the offence is to suggest that the patent is an existing one, and this would be achieved merely by the use of the words "patent" or "patented." But a representation that goods have been patented at some time, even though the patent may have expired, will not be an offence. Thus to mark goods "patented 1898" will not bother anyone, as it is obvious to any person interested that the 17 years' monopoly has long ago expired. It would also not be an offence to use these same words, even if a patent had never been granted--the reason being, of course, that an .obsolete patent, whether or not it ever existed, has no validity now, and so such a statement causes no embarrassment to anyone, and can only be regarded as an empty and absurd puff. Where the word "patent" has become an ordinary name of commerce, such as "patent leather" or "patent medicine," the section does not apply. I have now dealt with the seven principal offences, and these constitute the main structure of the Acts. There are, however, certain other matters which are of importance. You may remember that I said that some old-established and well-known trade descriptions which are palpably false, e.g. Epsom Salts, are exempted from the provisions of the Act of 1887, provided they were then lawfully and generally applied to goods of a particular class, or manufactured accord- ing to a particular method. The leading case concerns canned brislings which were described on the label as sardines. Evidence was given that the term "sardines" had been used on such goods by some traders before 1887, but nevertheless it was held that this practice was neither lawful nor in general use, and the manufacturers were convicted. Lord Reading, Lord Chief Justice, in his judgment, sug- gested that the reason why the defendants described Norwegian sprats as sardines was "because by that means they got a better sale for their goods, 221