THE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT pharmaceutical field, by the Pharmacy and Medicines Act, which requires medicines to disclose the correct formula. I would like to mention one other instance of the malerial composition of a preparation, which although not entirely relevant, may be of interest. Some of you are probably well aware of the ancient trade mark "Bristol Milk" applied to bottles of sherry. It may seem ludicrous to suggest that the word "milk," as used here, is a trade description relating to the material of which the goods are composed, but this in fact is what one Ministry did only a few years ago. After pressure had failed to induce the bottlers to abandon the mark, the Ministry threatened to prosecute and were only deterred by the publication of the facts in the Press and Parliament. The seventh (and last) definition is of rather limited interest and I shall deal with it only briefly. It concerns a description as to goods being the subject of an existing patent, privilege or copyright. The basis of the offence is to suggest that the patent is an existing one, and this would be achieved merely by the use of the words "patent" or "patented." But a representation that goods have been patented at some time, even though the patent may have expired, will not be an offence. Thus to mark goods "patented 1898" will not bother anyone, as it is obvious to any person interested that the 17 years' monopoly has long ago expired. It would also not be an offence to use these same words, even if a patent had never been granted--the reason being, of course, that an .obsolete patent, whether or not it ever existed, has no validity now, and so such a statement causes no embarrassment to anyone, and can only be regarded as an empty and absurd puff. Where the word "patent" has become an ordinary name of commerce, such as "patent leather" or "patent medicine," the section does not apply. I have now dealt with the seven principal offences, and these constitute the main structure of the Acts. There are, however, certain other matters which are of importance. You may remember that I said that some old-established and well-known trade descriptions which are palpably false, e.g. Epsom Salts, are exempted from the provisions of the Act of 1887, provided they were then lawfully and generally applied to goods of a particular class, or manufactured accord- ing to a particular method. The leading case concerns canned brislings which were described on the label as sardines. Evidence was given that the term "sardines" had been used on such goods by some traders before 1887, but nevertheless it was held that this practice was neither lawful nor in general use, and the manufacturers were convicted. Lord Reading, Lord Chief Justice, in his judgment, sug- gested that the reason why the defendants described Norwegian sprats as sardines was "because by that means they got a better sale for their goods, 221

JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF COSMETIC CHEMISTS and they got a better sale because the public did not know that they were buying sprats and not sardines." If the description was not in use before 1887, it is no defence to say that it has come into general use since then. The most recent instance of this is once again the vinegar case. Here it was proved that since 1890 a synthetic substance, which was quite wholesome, had been known first as "wood vinegar," then as "table vinegar," and since 1937 as "non-brewed vinegar." The Court, however, held that since the substance was not in fact vinegar, the description "non-brewed vinegar" was a false trade description. It was immaterial that the term was commonly used by the trade and approved by the Ministry of Food, for it had not been in use before 1887. The instances of trade descriptions which I have given so far have generally been statements recognisable as relating to goods. There are, in addition, provisions dealing with statements which are not ostensibly trade descriptions at all or which, although true statements in themselves, could be mistaken by the public for a statement having an entirely different meaning. The provisions under this sub-section of the Act fall into two parts: First, any trade description is deemed to be a false trade description-- even if true on the face of it--if it is likely to be mistaken for a false trade description. This would probably apply to a trade description which, while perfectly true, is qualified by an addition in inconspicuous type, e.g., PORT in large letters, with the/vord "type" in very small letters beneath it. Or the word SILK on a garment in large letters, and beneath it the modest addition "and rayon mixture." Here the description is true if read as a whole, but is likely to be read as something which is false. Incidentally (and I do not want to complicate matters too much) some authorities think that the examples I have just given are instances of misleading trade descriptions, which, although not able to be attacked under the old Act, are caught by amendments in the 1953 Act. The second part of the subsection is a new extension of the Act, for it applies to things which are not in themselves trade descriptions at all. The provision can be paraphrased in this way: anything, even if not a trade description at all on the face of it, is deemed to be a trade description if it is likely to be mistaken for one. Some indication of the intentions of the legis- lature in drafting this clause came out in the Parliamentary debates. It was then suggested that the new provision would implicate the expression "full of fashion" on stockings this is not a trade description at all, but neverthe- less it is likely to be mistaken for one that is, namely, "fully fashioned." I have already mentioned another example: tt-_e dress marked "less than half the price you would normally pay for an all-wool dress." Here the implica- tion was that the garment was all-wool, whereas in fact it was a mixture. This clause will probably also catch get-up of a type which would be 222